BV gives an objection:
1) The existence of God is necessary for the existence of creatures: no God, no creatures.
2) The existence of God is not sufficient for the existence of creatures: the existence of God does not entail the existence of creatures.
Therefore
3) God is really distinct from the act whereby he brings creatures into existence.
…Does it have any consequences for the doctrine of divine simplicity?
Response:
(A) If “God” means “creator” then (2) is false since the existence of a creator, as creator, suffices to explain the existence of creatures. Of course this immediately raises the question of whether God is necessarily or contingently a creator, and I say with Thomas that God is only contingently called a creator since “creator” isn’t said of God from eternity.
(B) The simplicity of God requires that things necessary for perfection absolutely are necessary for God. But believing God creates means believing creatures are not necessary for perfection since God will have (at least some) perfection prior to creating. Therefore the contingency of “God is creator” is compatible with absolute perfection and so also with the simplicity of God.
(C) In things with will, some acts of will are not necessary for perfection, namely those lacking a necessary relation to their proper good or ultimate end. But being a creator is not necessary for God’s proper good or ultimate end. Therefore, the contingency of the truth “God is creator” is not contrary to the perfection of God.
(D) Knowing differs from willing because knowing all possible things is an absolute perfection while willing all possible things is not. Therefore both willing and not willing is compatible with absolute perfection. If one wants to call both willing and not willing “contingency” – why quibble about words? – then some contingency is compatible with absolute perfection.
The “contingency” in question is what later Scholastics called positive indetermination as opposed to the negative indetermination of matter or potency. Positive indetermination is a part of a larger class of potentia meaning power as opposed to meaning potential.