Idealist notes

Eating and the idealist self. In both cases something is taken as cut off, appropriated to the self,  and purely subjective. Would it be a parsimonious view of eating to imagine the food was simply part of us?

All we are certain of is our own immediate perceptions. True, just as the only things I’m sure of eating are already within my body and so can be taken as given parts of it, just as a full tank is taken as a given part of any working engine. But in both cases don’t we have nothing but the other-than-self in the self? Does Idealism conflate what is in the self with the subjective?

Virus vs. knowledge. Both are things remain other-than-self within a self, but the first remains so by destroying the self, the second by perfecting it. The first is an impediment to life, the second a fulness of it.

-If the chair is the same height as the measuring rod, it is not parsimony to assume that all one needs is the chair. Some things – like being measured – can only be what they are by relation.

-Descartes is the last great Franciscan, but his epistemology arises downstream from Ockham denying the extra-mental reality of relations.  If relations are not real, one thing can be one with another only by constituting it: So either matter is fundamentally mind or vice versa.

-Aristotle is not off the hook either. Knowledge cannot unify act and potency as hylomorphic. All act-potency composites are physical and not noetic, the action arising from their nexus necessarily transitive and not immanent.

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