Gratia vere et mere sufficiens

1.) I divide free will from imperfect will. The will is free so far as its necessary orientation to the transcendental good can be realized in an indefinite number of concrete goods, the will is imperfect so far as it can choose moral evils as well as moral goods.

2.) All wills that do not enjoy an immediate union with God are both free and imperfect.

3.) Grace is given to those who do not enjoy an immediate union with God.

4.) Grace that did not suffice to achieve union with God would be pointless and ineffectual.

5.) Therefore, from (4) all grace suffices to attain immediate union with God, and from (3) goes to one that can choose the evil of rejecting grace. This is what Ott calls gratia mere et vere sufficiens. 

6.) Briefly, sufficient grace goes to imperfect willsThe objection that if sufficient grace can be rejected, how is it sufficient? misses that its sufficiency is precisely what suffices to an imperfect will as imperfect. If sufficient grace can be given to imperfect wills at all, it must be given in a way that can be rejected.

7.) Adding efficacious grace to sufficient grace either does away with the imperfection of the will or it doesn’t. If it does, then “efficacious grace” simply means “bestowing the beatific vision”; if it doesn’t then the efficacious grace is as rejectable as sufficient grace.

(So yes, I’m rejecting most of the Reformation-era accounts of sufficient vs. efficacious grace, including the Thomistic one.)

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