JOST on presence of the temporal in eternity (cont.)

18.) The whole intelligible basis (intelligentia) of this claim consists precisely in this: eternity cannot be a measure of things by coexisting by successive enumeration, but rather exhausts the whole quantity of the thing measured by a unified measure, in that it measures in the manner of one that possesses perfectly and not in the manner of enumeration or replication, i.e by diverse applications to the measured quantity. The eminence of the measure consists in its being elevated over all other created things in that these things cannot exhaust the whole quantity of the thing measured in a unified and unchanging manner of possession. The whole garment can’t be measured by a palm’s length…and it is only accidentally different whether the palm-measure is moved over the garment or the garment is moved over the palm-measure….

19.) Given thus, the objection from some others fails who said that a superior thing cannot contain an inferior one unless the inferior unless we suppose that the inferior exists in its proper domain of measure and is adequate to it, in the same way that I cannot be in this room unless I exist in my own proper place, and that I could not even be under the atmosphere except by a measure that was equal to my body, and I likewise couldn’t co-exist with the indivisible aevum without having my own proper measure, or even under eternity.

But this objection arises from an ignorance of the formal definition which eternity has in measuring in a way differently from created measures… created measures do not measure by possessing, but, precisely, by co-exisiting with something, either as changing or as applying the measured thing to them, and so are potential to the measuring of the thing. The measure awaits application to the measured things, as it is applied to them when they exist in themselves; thus it presupposes that they exist in themselves.

Still, it is very difficult to see how eternity could possess things that do not have existence in themselves but only exist potentially and within the causes that will bring them about in their proper domain of measure. By what action is the being posited in eternity according to its real being when it does not have being in itself? How can it pass from from possibility to actuality and real existence through an action that is a change in itself without introducing some change into the changeless domain of eternity?

(skipping first objection and response)

23.) A second objection is that it is impossible for eternity to co-exist with temporal things unless they exist and have duration since nothing co-exists with another unless it exists in itself. But a temporal thing can’t exist from eternity as really produced and existing in its own domain of measure, nor can it exist with an eternal being communicated to it from God, since eternity is an attribute of the absolute that cannot be shared with creatures. Thus, temporal beings only exist as contained in their causes, in which they have existence only potentially and not really, or they only have eternity as things known exist in a knower.

24.) Neither can it be said in response that temporal things exist really in eternity, but just not in their proper measure, but as drawn to and elevated by a higher measure. Against this, it can be said that created being is not measured just by eternity as it is within God as a creative essence since this is the same as the measure of God himself, to whom eternity belongs essentially and not by participation and derivatively. So eternity must measure created being as outside of God and in its proper being, which presupposes existence in its proper domain outside of the action of God and outside their own causes, so that it could happen that it be elevated and drawn toward eternity: for nothing can be elevated to eternity unless it intrinsically has both being and duration of its own to be elevated, for neither existence nor duration can belong to something by extrinsic determination…

25.) I respond: Things exist in eternity in their proper being but not their proper measure but as belonging to another that is higher (in aliena et altiori), so that there is not a distinct existence of the thing in time and eternity but the same existence under different measures…

26.) Still, we clearly need to explain more deeply how the existence of created things might be of itself outside of its causes and elevated to eternity if it be not changed from non-being to being and produced in fact.

We respond that eternity does not measure created things immediately and as supposing they are already produced in themselves, but precisely as contained by the divine action as its term, from which they are related to and regarded as created things. So created being need not be considered as virtually within God and as God himself, nor only as it is in omnipotence and within created causes as a possible being but as related to the action of God. The action of God is eternal in itself while still having a temporal effect, for as DT says:

The power of God is always conjoined to its operation thought the effect follows from the command his will, and so it si not necessary that an effect always be conjoined to him, nor that creatures arise from eternity.

Since “an eternal effect does not follow from the eternal action of God, rather, God wills the sort of nature that arises”.

In other causes, the effect follows immediately upon the positing of the action, and so in considering the action of God in eternity and the effect passively changing in time there is something not common. The effect can be considered in two ways: (1) and changeable and passive, and this is the basis of its measure in its proper domain – so taken it is not eternal because it is not immutable. In another way it can be taken precisely as a terminus connoting and given in respect to an eternal action, and so taken it is said to be drawn to a higher mode of measurement, because the action itself is measured by the measure of which it is the term, though it is not changeable due to that measure, but it is connoted by it.

27.) If you object further that things considered as in the divine action, and not yet as changeable and passively produced in themselves, are also not yet understood to have being in themselves but only in their causes and in becoming. This is manifest because, in the divine action, they do not yet have created being but either the same existence as the action, making them uncreated, or they are producible by the action but not yet produced, making them not yet existing outside of their causes and so not measured by eternity in a way different from the existence of those causes.

We respond that as long as a thing is not changeable in itself and produced passively outside of its causes it does not yet exist in in its own domain of measure and duration proportioned to itself, for so taken it is still in its causes and able to be brought from non being into being. That said, it is still understood to have being being outside of its causes if it is the terminus of an action already existing in reality, when that action is understood not in first act but in second, making the effect be in second act, and so existing in itself. Because the divine action is not always to a changeable passive effect as a creative action, but changelessly in itself changes creatures in time by a decree of free choice, this gives rise to a twofold measure of the things as the term of an action, (1) an eternal and immutable measure measuring an eternal action existing in second act, whose term is seen as from the action, and (2) a temporal measure that changes in in time from the action and places it in its domain of proper measure.

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