JOST on the presence of the temporal in eternity. Article 3, (selections)

4.) Nonetheless it must without doubt be said of that DT believes things not only have an objective presence as a thing known in the foreknowledge of eternity, but he also assumes a presence relative to eternity itself and the action of eternity inasmuch as they are measured by the immutable measure of the eternal, even when not measured by the successive measure belonging to the temporal domain.

Having set aside an objective presence in the manner of a thing foreknown and setting forth a present relative to eternity as a measure of duration… there remains no other present moment except one of co-existence and duration. This is not because things which do not yet exist in themselves co-exist with God in their proper domain of measured duration as effects, but because they are affected and elevated to the higher measure of eternity, in a manner to be explained below, and which was insinuated in the previous article. So the very duration and measure of time under which things arise and pass successively in their own proper and homogeneous domain exists as something contained in eternity,  not as a measure nor as exercising measure but as contained and measured under an immutable eternal modality.

5.) …That DT understands the presence of duration and real existence in eternity is proved as a consequence that DT often makes, sc. that God understands future contingents in themselves from the fact that they are present in eternity and not from the fact that they are sometimes present in time. This particular present in time is the future of another time not now present, and the two are joined only as objects of foreknowledge. So he is proving the presence of an object in foreknowledge from the presence of something else that is not objective, since otherwise he would be proving things to be present objectively because they were present objectively. If, as some authors say, the objective presence that times had in eternity is nothing but the presence they have in themselves and outside of their causes in time, [their objective presence] would be their objective presence in eternal foreknowledge, which would be a vacuous tautology.

13-14.) [Proof that STA bases his opinion on the Church Fathers]

15.) The reason for this opinion is the one shown in the previous article: that eternity is a real and true measure of created duration, at least when things exist in their own domain of measurement. If eternity neither measured it when it existed in its own domain nor before it existed in itself, it would not contain created duration in any way. Thus it would only contain concomitantly and co-exist per accidens with the duration of temporal things, in the way that the indivisible duration of the angels does. If, as we suppose, eternity sometimes measures created duration but cannot do this by either an intrinsic or even extrinsic succession, it is necessary that the flowing duration of time cannot coexist with eternity as sometimes existing and other times not, but it has to be always measured by it and therefore always co-exist with it.

16.) The whole problem consists in the proof of the minor premise, sc. that eternity, in measuring,  lacks any sort of succession, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. For the authors opposed to us have a very strong argument (faciunt vim) and think that we are laboring under an equivocation when we prove that, given the highest immutability and indivisibility of eternity, we prove that successive things eternally co-exist with it.

They say that eternity is immutable and indivisible in itself entitatively and intrinsically but the successive things that are extrinsic to it cannot co-exist indivisibly, not from an imperfection in eternity but from the successive things themselves. Thus they co-exist with eternity by themselves changing and not by any change in it, making eternity only changeable extrinsically but not intrinsically and manifold virtually but unified formally, as though some measure were fixed and we measured quantities by sending them across it, like a tree fixed by a river touching the waters passing by it – it would measure by something extrinsic to the tree and not by a change in the tree. In the same way a an immense magnitude co-exists with me without making me co-exist in every place the immense magnitude does.

(these last paragraphs were compressed and edited)

17a.) Sed contra: Eternity is not just indivisible entitatively and in itself but also in its measuring, whether intrinsically or extrinsically. This follows from the definition of eternity as a wholly simultaneous and perfect possession – and so whatever it measures or contains, even extrinsically, it also measures by possessing wholly and simultaneously and not by the application or replication of succession in its measuring. Eternity is not said to be “a way of possessing… except with respect to how it measures”, or by eternity itself standing fixed while measured things are successively applied to it… [if it were] it would not measure by possessing the thing all at once, but by touching others as they run across it. The tree by a river, even if it is fixed in place, nevertheless does not contain all the water at once when it touches it, and so does not measure by possession but by succession, not of itself, but of its act of measuring.

So any part being given in succession, whether on the part of the measured thing that is applied or on the part of the measuring, destroys the possession, just as I would be said not to possess something whether this happened from the thing not coming to me or because I do not possess it. So if eternity measures by extrinsic succession… it could not contain and measure in a perfect manner of possession but in an enumerated way, such that it would not extend to the whole duration of time in a unified and unchanging manner…

17b.)  The example brought forth about the immense magnitude also misses the point, for it does not co-exist by drawing things to itself or by measuring them in an immutable way, but only through exterior contact, by giving them a proper place, and so it measures just as changeably as the things that are put in contact with it. Eternity does not measure things by changing with them, for things that so measure co-exist with the things in their proper domain. [Were it to measure in this way] eternity would not co-exist with the things measured and contained by simultaneously and uniformly possessing all, but would itself stand materially and concomitantly to eternity. The things measured, in turn, would not formally be defined as measured and reduced to the uniformity of the simultaneous possession characteristic of eternity…

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