Ancient vs. Classical-modern physics (2)

If motion is ontologically indefinable in the way that mathematical physics seems to take it, it is an irreducible transcendental and so is convertible with being.

One can do physics just fine without ever taking it as an ontology, and one can have this ontology without doing physics from a conviction that motion is unavoidably given.

By motion I’m including time, and so the conviction that there is no thought without time is a variant on this same idea. Here too kinesis is being.

But is it indefinable? The insistence that motion is always background relative suggests that it is a sort of relation. Still, if it is a relation it is not in the category of relation and is therefore still transcendental, and the claim would remain that there is nothing more one can say to specify the transcendental relation than “it is moving with respect to”. In the end, this is all the background amounts to: that motion is always motion with respect to something.

%d bloggers like this: