The PSR and observing nothing

STA seems unaware of the principle of sufficient reason, and would almost certainly reject any formulation of it that wasn’t explicit on the difference between what happened by chance and what didn’t. But there is almost certainly some version of the PSR that works, but I think that it leads us to seeing that all our observations and perceptions are a mix of being and non-being.

The Medieval world was chock-full of purely chance connections, not because they thought “chance” was an ectoplasm pervading the world and causing things to happen with no reason, but because human intelligence was constantly associating things that, in fact, have no association at all. I wear yellow socks and my team wins, so now I can feel the causal connection between socks and winning. So what’s the sufficient reason for my team winning when I wear yellow socks? Sure, there might be an interesting story to tell about the sufficient reason for why I think there is such a thing, but there is no reason for the event itself.

But don’t I observe my team winning when I wear yellow socks? Isn’t it as bona fide an observation as seeing the pot boil when I put it on the stove? Things might change if I repeat the observations, but this would be pointless for any conviction I had of one-off causal observations (of the kind one finds all the time in history and one’s own life, for example), and all sorts of chance observations repeat.

So is the PSR the claim that for everything there is a sufficient reason, but yellow-socks-and-winning is not a thing? But then our observations are a mix of being and non-being. Our first principle is the principle of contradiction because our fundamental predicament is needing to separate being and non-being that show up as equivalent in observation.

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