A half-ontological argument

Three Preambles:

I: The transcendental multitude is a concept that occurs first in STA. It is a multitude of substances or independent beings wherein each member is undivided, but the members are not homogeneous with each other. Because they are not homogeneous they cannot be material, and so the transcendental multitude is only a feature of supernatural beings.

II: The Leibniz-Brentano axiom is to know that a necessary being is really possible means to know that it really exists. “Possible” in this sense means we know that a proof cannot rule it out. This is clear from mathematical things: if we could demonstrate that no proof against a mathematical theorem were possible, the theorem would be necessary.

III: By “being” I mean ens commune, or being as known to us, abstracted from sense data and proportioned to it.

Here’s an argument that STA would probably take as an objection:

The analysis of being requires a necessary, supernatural being. 

1.) If any argument makes the transcendental multitude impossible, it would be impossible for us to know that being is not a genus.

Given there are multitudes, if none can be transcendental then all must be material. But if multitudes must be material then they must be homogeneous, and it would therefore be impossible for us to know that they are not one in genus.

2.) We know that being is not a genus.

This is one of the first things we figured out about it.

3.) Therefore, an analysis of ens commune shows that the transcendental multitude is possible.

4.) Therefore, the supernatural is possible (from the definition of transcendental multitude).

“Possible” in the sense required by the Leibniz-Brentano axiom.

5.) All supernatural things are either necessary or caused by the necessary (if they were intrinsically contingent, they would have matter, and so be natural.)

6.) Therefore, from the Leibniz-Brentano axiom, a supernatural necessary being exists either in itself or as cause.

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