Goofing around with PW logic

Say you scroll out all possible worlds before God and he actualizes Q. What happened?

1.) Did one possible world choose another? This can’t be right, since as possible it can’t do anything.

2.) Did something in no possible world make a possible world actual? But, on the PW scheme, this means that something impossible happened.

3.) Did the actual world choose a possible one? But qua actual it is either other than a possible world or not. If other, we get #2; if not, #1.

4.) Is Q the same as God’s actual world or not? Not the same, since one can’t actualize what is already actual. Not other, since we can’t have two things fitting the description of “the actual world”, leaving us to say, for example, that God exists and does not exist in the actual world.

There are tensed statements in possible worlds. Therefore there is one actual clock for all of them. But there isn’t even one clock for us, so there are no tensed statements in possible worlds. So by PW logic,  tensed statements are impossible. Therefore this could not have been written.


  1. David said,

    March 26, 2017 at 10:24 am

    So God does not ground possibility on the PW scheme. But doesn’t that make God and the actual world sort of a brute fact?

    • March 26, 2017 at 10:16 pm

      Say more. Do you mean that if I argue this way then I’m left with God and the actual world as with no explanation? Or that this follows if there is no ground of possibility? Something else?

      • David said,

        March 26, 2017 at 11:54 pm

        It seems to follow if nothing is prior to just bare possibility. I might be off here, but it just seems that the way the PW scheme places possibility as prior to God, it leaves the existence of God as a brute fact… Even if the conclusion of Plantinga’s OA is that He is necessary in all possible worlds, it seems like a brute fact that this one is the actual one.

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