B-Theorists say that all times co-exist, but they don’t say that all times co-exist at one time. In this sense they seem to agree with A-theorists, who also see it as impossible for all times to exist at one time but who see this as connected to the fact that times can’t co-exist at all.
B-Theorists deny the passage of time but keep its order, but the only way to make this the right sort of order is to make it spacial. But this is to illicitly assume the time that is required for spacial order since spacial wholes have to be together at one time in order to be together at all: you can never have a car if you busily assemble it while some demon behind you just as busily undoes your work.
Let’s assume, as the lit seems to bear out, that A-theory has lost the argument against B. This leaves us having to specify some non-temporal domain in which all the times of the B-theory can co-exist. Notice that if we do this we also discover a rapprochement between the two theories, since our need to unify all times in the non-temporal means that the A-theory is true so far as time is considered in itself, apart from this non-temporal ground of unity. This can both explain why B-theory must ultimately win out and why its success ends up preserving the truth of A-theory.
Any non-temporal ground of all time is eternal in a robust sense, but there is a long history of seeing this ground not as God but as a world-soul, an option that Teske proves Augustine was open to. Our own intellectual climate would probably prefer to call the ground divine. Any account, however, makes put human life and this non-temporal ground itself and this non-temporal ground in dialogue about the world we find around us. In fact, so far as truth and being are one the world around us just is this dialogue.