1.) Some things said of both God and creatures are transcendentals of being (being, one, good, etc.), and so are said of many genera. When said of God, the transcendental is understood just as it is, in complete simplicity. And so the distinction of the objection is too crude: so far as the transcendental is viewed in itself and apart from all composition, it is applied as a whole to God, and is even considered as God. So far as the transcendental is viewed as a part of a larger genus, then a part of the concept is applied to God, but in such a state of separation it cannot belong to a creature.
Other things said of God and creatures are not transcendentals of being, but still transcend genera so far as they are proper to intelligence (justice, wisdom, mercy, joy) and are said of God in the same way, i.e. so far as they are considered simply in themselves and not as composed with any genus (like quality or activity or passivity). cf. Phaedo 100c-e; De trinitate VIII c. 3, or R. Glen Coughlin Note on naming God, esp. pp 10-15.
2.) A thing is verified by whatever confirms its truth, and so verification by sense belongs only to what exists in sense. Verification is diverse processes for physics, calculation, political theory, mathematics, literary criticism, metaphysics, etc. Like the word “evidence”, “verified” has far too many meanings to allow for a blanket condemnation of any discourse as failing to provide it.
3.) God’s existence and properties both exist on the theoretical level, in the same way that mathematical existence and properties do, but this does not preclude real existence because a spiritual thing, just as mathematical things, transcends the difference between the abstract and concrete. The number and the shape one learns is both this one and all instances; the and therefore the soul or mind containing such things must also be both this mind and all instances. Furthermore, the angel that transcends both the human mind and and the cosmos is also both itself and its own intelligible world; and God presses all this to its limit. Existence is only limited to “The concrete” as opposed to the abstract at the lowest level of existence, sc. of material things. Failure to recognize this has led to countless fruitless disputes: Nominalism vs. realism; Aristotelianism vs. Platonism; the separate agent intellect vs. the personal mind; Unitarianism/ Modalism against orthodox Trinitarianism; the interaction problem, etc. All fall on the sword of what we might call Aristotle’s folly, i.e. the semi-materialist belief that all existence is limited to the concrete existence that is peculiar to sensible particulars cf. H. Cherniss, Aristotle’s criticism of Plato and the Academy.
4.) “Logical possibility” is whenever a mind sees no opposition between a subject and a predicate. For a fallible mind, therefore, logical possibility must be distinguished into what in fact has no contradiction (like something that actually exists) and what admits of an unseen contradiction. “Real possibility” means either logical possibility in the first sense, or what is potential. Since God cannot have real possibility in the second sense, we prove that he is both really possible and logically possible by the same argument, sc. by a causal reference to creatures.