Knowledge and algorithm

Our accounts of knowledge and truth have reasons to try to explain knowledge by logic, then logic by formal structures, then formal structures by algorithms and symbols. This is all fine, and it’s hard to see how any other approach to knowledge will be able to develop similar degrees of subtlety, precision, and progress. But one limitation of the method is that it cannot account for the difference between knowledge and prejudice, since it can give no account of insight.



  1. April 14, 2015 at 11:35 am

    I’m supposed to be working here, so I don’t have chapter and verse handy, but didn’t de Koninck at one point oppose reason to intellect, in that it approaches it’s object as a limit?

    • April 14, 2015 at 12:02 pm

      That sounds like something he would say. Thomas Sheehan makes a similar point in his book on Rahner, though without making intellect a term of the motion.

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