It would be interesting to compare the relation between haecceity and what might be called super-haecceity. Super-haecceity is the idea that Socrates is individuated by not by haecceitas but by Socriety, and “Socriety” is said equivocally of all persons named Socrates, just as each proper name is. For example, my son might be called James too, but his James means him and mine means me, and neither one means some general thing that we share in common.

My first guess would be that Haecceity just is super-haecceity, and that the latter simply draws out the fact that haecceity can only be known by pure negation. This raises the question of whether we can understand it theoretically at all, or whether Haecceity is really the last signpost at the end of theoretical inquiry, pointing to that which is real but incapable of generalization.

Similar questions arise about the very idea of person, a term which means to go beyond mere community of nature to something positive, though this positive feature is incapable of the sort of generalization that science demands of subjects. Even calling it “a positive feature” distorts its character, since no feature is multiplied when persons are, any more than a dim room get more light if we bring in low calorie food.

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