Evidential arguments from evil

Once upon a time, philosophers refuted the existence of God with logical arguments from evil which tried to conclude to the logical impossibility of God. These proved unworkable: it was too easy to find merely logically possible defeaters since even an outlandish, fanciful, far-fetched and emotionally unsatisfying theodicy could still be logically possible. This caused everyone to switch to evidential arguments from evil, which admitted the logical possibility of God but claimed that we should assign him a vanishingly small probability. But “vanishingly small” is still not zero, and so such arguments were committed to quantifying the (now given) logical possibility of God.

But this approach can’t work, and it ends up proving the opposite of what it aims at. If a creator God doesn’t exist, then the only way we could get one would be to create him, but a creator-creature is a pretty straightforward contradiction. This means that

(a.) if God doesn’t exist then it is impossible for him to exist.

The problem is that the evidential argument from evil ends up making (a) into an argument modus tollens, and so ends up proving the existence of God.

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