The generality of the named

We can say things that neither exist nor can be understood, and in this sense the named is more general and universal than being, and contains it as a subset.

But this can’t be quite right. The ‘generality’ in question is one made by ignorance: either plain ignorance or of an ideal construction or simplification that we need to make when the real thing is too hard to understand in its own right. But ignorance can’t contain the real.

This might be one critique of the Anselm’s ontological argument: it tries to make the real a subset of the named, and then shift to the former by way of the difference that it is better to exist not only in thought (that is, by way of the sense of the name.)

1 Comment

  1. Carl said,

    September 3, 2014 at 7:17 am

    Doesn’t it follow from Cantor’s theory of real numbers that there are more numbers than names for numbers?

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