The denial of free will and omne quod movetur

The contemporary argument against free will given by Harris, Gazzaninga and many others (and found ad litteram from Lucretius to Einstein) makes an appeal to the major premise of the classical theistic argument that everything in motion is moved by another. After reducing reality to fundamental inert particles, motion can only be initiated from another. To initiate motion would mean to have no need of some energy source, but no motion is of this sort.

That said, omne quod is broader than the modern version of it used in the free will argument. St. Thomas, for example, reduces the truth of the premise to material causality, or to the fact that mobiles need parts forming a larger whole. This reminds one of the modern form of the argument, where nothing in motion can be isolated from a larger system. Either way, the premise deserves a larger hearing in philosophy of science.

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