Revelation vs. ID

Let’s stipulate arguendo that ID is any argument that claims that to discover by way of empirical science that some feature of the world is fashioned by God intervening in an already created natural world.

Now revelation is also an act of God intervening in the already created natural world, but there is one important difference between it an ID: Revelation is given immediately to some person who is called to give testimony to it. We can go further than this: revelation requires that God manifest his activity to us and ID requires that he hide his activity from us (we don’t have scientific conclusions about manifest things). How significant is this difference?

My suspicion is that this difference is significant and that it creates problems for those who argue from the existence of divine interventions in salvation history to the fittingness of divine interventions in natural history. Obviously, I can’t argue that it’s impossible for God to intervene in natural history if I admit he intervenes in salvation history. The argument has to be put in terms of something else: either that it is unfitting or somehow contrary to revelation. All my arguments are rough sketches but I’m confident that they at least point towards an argument worth taking seriously. The thesis I’m interested in defending is that it is reasonable to assume that divine interventions in the world are limited to salvation history and excluded from natural history.

It seems necessary that the act of intervention be something of a higher order than the mere act of creation, and intervention in creation is not such a thing. God can presumably create the world either with all it needs to do its work or not, and intervention requires him to make the second sort of world. But what sort of artisan has ever acted in such a way? Newton thought, for example, that God had to specially intervene in the world to keep it from collapsing from its own gravitation. But this makes the world a ridiculous and ill-designed thing- it is something like a tent with a central pole you have to continually hold up after you first put it in place. Intervention in natural history, unlike intervention in salvation history, seems to cast aspersions on God’s skill as an intelligent artisan and creator. But revelation is not a secondary modification of the natural world that makes up for its inability to bring things forth. Revelation can come to a world that is of itself a closed system, that is, a system with all the powers it needs to account for its natural history, because revelation is not something in this natural history. Christ’s feeding of the multitude is not supposed to fill out a deficiency in nature or account for some natural phenomenon, but to immediately manifest to human consciousness an order of grace that transcends nature.

Again, such special intervention in nature seems contrary to the purpose of making human minds. If special intervention is necessary to explain natural things, natural science does not explain the origins of natural things any more than it explains the origins of airplanes or computers. But knowing the world by way of science seems to be one of the reasons human beings exist. Seen from this angle, special intervention in natural history seems like a sort of deception.

Last, there seems to be something necessary about divine interventions in history being manifest. Here I’m thinking of Christ’s words to Caiaphas: I have spoken openly before the world; my teaching has been given in the synagogue and in the temple, where all the Jews forgather; nothing that I have said was said in secret. I’m thinking also of the various gnostic gospels which seem to be ruled out of the canon in part because they speak of Christ doing private miracles that were separated from his public mission, say, as a child for other kids. But the “hidden miracles” of God secretly tinkering with protein molecules seem to be this sort of thing. 

 

Advertisements

33 Comments

  1. Crude said,

    May 9, 2014 at 12:17 pm

    Let’s stipulate arguendo that ID is any argument that claims that to discover by way of empirical science that some feature of the world is fashioned by God intervening in an already created natural world.

    I know, I know – arguendo. But that’s so far from ID as to not be ID. ID makes the claim that some aspects of the natural world can be inferred, pending additional evidence, to be the work of an intelligent agent. I bring this up despite your arguendo only because people keep casting ID as if a version like yours really was an accurate summary of it.

    But this makes the world a ridiculous and ill-designed thing- it is something like a tent with a central pole you have to continually hold up after you first put it in place. Intervention in natural history, unlike intervention in salvation history, seems to cast aspersions on God’s skill as an intelligent artisan and creator.

    This is a common criticism, but I just don’t see it. It relies on knowing what God intended with a given act of creation, and then deciding that there was a better way to attain it than the way God chose – with the problem lingering that God is an omniscient, omnipotent being and we aren’t privy to His design scheme.

    Assume hypothetically that a given part of nature requires constant intervention by God. You can say ‘how inefficient! what poor design!’, but really – you’re dealing with a designer with infinite resources and capability. Efficiency matters for me and you, the individuals with finite time and power and resources. But for God?

    • May 9, 2014 at 1:23 pm

      This is a common criticism, but I just don’t see it. It relies on knowing what God intended with a given act of creation, and then deciding that there was a better way to attain it than the way God chose – with the problem lingering that God is an omniscient, omnipotent being and we aren’t privy to His design scheme.

      It is very unsatisfying to defend Newton’s claim that God keeps the universe from collapsing by saying, in effect, “God could do anything, so why not this?” The better argument would be that if he made the universe he made it in such a way that it wouldn’t collapse. The general principle is that when you make something you give it what it needs to do what it does. Otherwise, why make it at all?

      • Crude said,

        May 9, 2014 at 5:13 pm

        The better argument would be that if he made the universe he made it in such a way that it wouldn’t collapse.

        It sure won’t be collapsing if He’s sustaining it. Again, that just seems to circle on back to human design concerns. Which actually leads to another problem…

        The general principle is that when you make something you give it what it needs to do what it does. Otherwise, why make it at all?

        But what does it need to do? That just circles on back to the question of knowing what the designer intended to begin with, and the recognition that any given structure may well have multiple purposes. A hypothetical universe where Newton was correct may have been created so not only to sustain the universe, but to communicate something to the universe’s inhabitants who discovered that facet of the universe.

        Now, with that in mind, I think it’s reasonable to make if-then evaluations of purported design to a degree: if God intended X, then Y. If God intended that mice live forever, then He wouldn’t have created cats. Sure, go for it. But I think it’s important not to lose sight of the ‘if’ at work there, because the ‘then’ only does work so long as the ‘if’ is stable.

        I think that also serves as a partial reply to your summary. It’s not just ‘God can do anything, so why not this?’ but ‘God has who knows how many purposes in mind in creation, such that it seems extremely risky to rule out a given state of affairs purely on the grounds of purported ‘efficient design’ considerations alone.’ If it turned out that ID was ‘correct’, that discovery would certainly communicate something to us about nature and (given your arguendo) God. Maybe that communication would be the very thing intended by that particular natural structure.

      • Wade McKenzie said,

        May 10, 2014 at 11:00 am

        But shouldn’t this same principle apply as well to salvation history?

        If God ought ideally to make the cosmos in such a way that it doesn’t collapse, oughtn’t he also make man–the microcosmos–in such a way that he doesn’t collapse and thus require salvage–salvation?

      • May 10, 2014 at 12:21 pm

        The usual way of understanding the fall is that God did create human beings in that way, i.e. the point of explaining human evil by a fall is to explain why it doesn’t trace back to some deficiency or defect in creation. Any theology that tries to account for evil by God setting man up to fall seems to be missing the point of the Genesis myth.

        We can, of course, argue over whether we can trace evil back to human choice without implicating the Creator in it. But the whole point of a fall-account of evil seems to be to assert precisely this.

  2. Stephen H. Webb said,

    May 9, 2014 at 1:14 pm

    Why assume that salvation history is something very different from natural history, so different as to require different accounts of how God acts in the world. And why assume that God did not use so-called secondary causes in creating the world. The Fathers did not make that assumption.

    • May 9, 2014 at 1:28 pm

      Why assume that salvation history is something very different from natural history

      I wrote a paragraph in answer to that, sc. #2.

      And why assume that God did not use so-called secondary causes in creating the world.

      If you mean “why does God not use secondary causes as supplemental interventions in nature after the act of creation?”, I gave arguments about that.

      If you mean “why does creation not employ secondary causes?” Then this is a question about creation, which is Is not being dealt with formally here. But my response is that its does not use them because to do so is impossible. Whatever creates is God, no secondary cause is God, therefore, etc.

      • Stephen H. Webb said,

        May 10, 2014 at 5:57 pm

        1. Creation is not just an initial act but also continuous, what the fathers called creatio continua. God permits secondary causes to act on their own, but their independence is not absolute. Everything that is, as it is, and as it develops, depends upon God’s continuing act of creation.
        2. God created a world in which he could intervene.
        3. His interventions are thus disruptions of the natural order of things only to our limited perspectives. They are interventions to him. This is his world.
        4. His revelations us involve his “intervention” just as much as his guidance of biological evolution.
        5. We have to interpret his revelations to us. Unless we are a very special Prophet, like Moses, and unlike Jesus Christ, we have to decide whether God has acted in our lives and used words in our heads to give us direction. We infer God’s providential presence from the best available act.
        6. Inferring God’s purposeful design for nature is very similar to what we do when we think about how God designs our lives.

  3. Wade McKenzie said,

    May 10, 2014 at 12:59 pm

    Thank you for your reply, which I find interesting. Is it nonetheless open to the following objection?

    We’ll agree that a wise man is perfectly free, yet refrains from choosing evil. Perhaps we’d agree furthermore that a wise man is a perfect man– the perfection, or at least *a* perfection, of humankind.

    That man in the ostensibly perfect beginning chose evil shows that he was unwise. Was this not a defect, a lack–in other words, going back to the principle you articulated vis a vis the cosmos, ought not God have created man in such a way that he would not collapse or fall through lack of wisdom?

    • May 10, 2014 at 1:39 pm

      This is a case of trying to argue against the possibility that evil can be explained by a fall. You are arguing, in effect, that evil must reduce back to the first cause of things. This argument is either sound or not. If not, then no response is necessary. If sound, however, it undermines the basis of salvation history and so renders the reason for forming the argument in the first place moot. Salvation history only makes sense as a response to an evil that does not reduce to divine weakness or incompetence, and so if no such evil is possible then salvation history is impossible.

      • Wade McKenzie said,

        May 10, 2014 at 2:07 pm

        So then you don’t agree that man’s lack of wisdom in the ostensibly perfect beginning was an imperfection?

  4. Wade McKenzie said,

    May 10, 2014 at 2:44 pm

    What you’re saying is that my line of questioning is impertinent to the point that you’re trying to make–and perhaps it is.

    But you’re the one who injected the Genesis myth into the discussion and asserted that the intent of the Genesis myth is that evil cannot be traced back to God, but only to man–evil is a *fall* of man, not a creation of God.

    But if men, in the Genesis myth, chose evil–corrupted themselves, fell–then they were unwise. God created, in the Genesis myth, an unwise man and woman. This seems to me to be an obvious imperfection in the creation of man, so far as the Genesis myth is concerned.

    If so, then the author of the Genesis myth was mistaken in thinking that this story would show that evil doesn’t reduce to the first cause of things. Alternatively, the intent of the story was different. Or, thirdly–perhaps lack of wisdom is *not* an imperfection?

    • May 10, 2014 at 4:55 pm

      This seems clearly to equivocate on what we’re talking about when talking about ‘wisdom’. In “if men, in the Genesis myth, chose evil–corrupted themselves, fell–then they were unwise”, the only thing that can reasonably be meant is that the act of choosing evil was itself unwise. But in “God created, in the Genesis myth, an unwise man and woman”, the word ‘unwise’ has to be taken as meaning that they lacked some disposition to, or virtue of, wisdom that they should have had. These are simply not the same thing; if they were, it would be impossible for anyone who is virtuous to do something wrong or cease to be virtuous by doing something wrong, which is obviously false, and would likewise be impossible for anyone not virtuous to gain virtue because they would need the virtue to do the actions that through practice make the virtue possible.

      • Wade McKenzie said,

        May 10, 2014 at 7:33 pm

        Thank you for your response–perhaps I’m missing something here.

        But let me note that in the first part of your reply, you speak of wisdom–as do I. In the second part of your reply, you speak instead of virtue or being virtuous–a subtle shift.

        Now, I wouldn’t deny that a “virtuous” man can do wrong. For example, a courageous man could fall into adultery or, conversely, a maritally faithful man could exhibit cowardice. In either case, these men could retain their claim to being virtuous in other respects.

        But I would deny that a *wise* man could commit adultery, or exhibit cowardice, or–returning to the Genesis myth–disobey God, yet continue to claim that he is wise.

        He could, of course, resume the quest of wisdom but that would be to say that he is yet striving to become wise. That prelapsarian Adam was unwise seems to me an indubitable point, ergo I claim that the Genesis myth depicts God’s creation of an unwise man and woman, a man and a woman who would inevitably require God’s salvation, just as Newton requires that God buttress the cosmos against its inherent tendency to collapse.

        Brandon, could you portray an example of a wise man committing sin or doing wrong and yet remaining in the same moment and afterward an authentically wise man?

      • May 10, 2014 at 8:18 pm

        But let me note that in the first part of your reply, you speak of wisdom–as do I. In the second part of your reply, you speak instead of virtue or being virtuous–a subtle shift.

        No, not at all; the distinction being made is between ‘wise’ applying to action and ‘wise’ as applying to disposition to action (traditionally called a virtue), or in the negative, ‘unwise’ as meaning an action inconsistent with wisdom and ‘unwise’ as meaning lacking the disposition that we call wisdom. If you mean it in some other sense than that disposition usually called the virtue of wisdom, you’ll have to specify.

  5. May 10, 2014 at 8:29 pm

    Brandon, could you portray an example of a wise man committing sin or doing wrong and yet remaining in the same moment and afterward an authentically wise man?

    Sorry, I missed this question. But it simply highlights the obvious problem. Suppose we have a wise man; and suppose he does something wrong. There is no major tradition in virtue ethics in which this would necessitate that he not still have the wisdom in the sense of the disposition to wise acts, because dispositions sometimes fail to be exercised. But let’s suppose it did. Then what we’re talking about is someone who originally was wise, who did something unwise, and in doing that unwise thing stopped being wise. There’s nothing impossible about this, either. But this is also radically different from what you are suggesting, which is that if anyone does any unwise action, they never could have had any disposition to wise actions to begin with. This commits one to saying it is impossible for anyone who is ever unwise ever to gain wisdom; and vice versa, that it is impossible for anyone who is ever wise in disposition ever to stop being so. This is not generally true of any other kind of disposition human good, excellence, or perfection, so it’s utterly unclear why it would be true of wisdom. But either way, unwise actions and unwise dispositions are distinct things.

    • Wade McKenzie said,

      May 11, 2014 at 12:16 pm

      It may be that “there is no major tradition in virtue ethics”, etc. And while I certainly wouldn’t disparage the tradition or actively seek to disregard it, I am admittedly unconcerned with it here because I think the point I’m making derives more from common sense than philosophy proper.

      I do not contend, nor do I believe that I am obliged to contend, that “it is impossible for anyone who is ever unwise ever to gain wisdom.”

      But you’re right that I do indeed contend “that it is impossible for anyone who is ever wise in disposition ever to stop being so.” To stop being wise is never to have been wise in the first place. In some sense, the wise man possesses all the other virtues.

      I hate to belabor the point anymore than I already have. Please recall, however, that everything I’m saying on this line has to do with James Chastek’s above citation of the Genesis myth as an example of how salvation history attempts to show that God created man complete, without inherent need for salvation–that man now requires salvation is not due to any incompleteness in the original creation of man.

      I argue, however, that–in the Genesis myth–Adam obviously is not a wise man. And I contend that this is a crucial incompleteness in the creation of man–again, according to the Genesis myth.

      Perhaps the most constructive question that I could pose to you would be: do you assert that Adam in the Garden of Eden–or man before the fall–was wise?

      • May 12, 2014 at 2:42 pm

        The problem with common sense in this context is that all genuine common sense is imprecise and assumes normal cases, for the obvious reason that common sense is practical, and what matters for practice is simply precision sufficient for practical purposes and accuracy suitable for what usually happens. This context clearly would not be the sort of case we usually face and would also clearly require precision different from that which we usually require.

        I don’t see how you’re introducing the asymmetry here. If it is impossible for someone ever wise in disposition to stop being wise, then why isn’t it impossible for someone not wise in disposition to start being wise?

        I also don’t see how the Adam case changes anything at all; our only reason for making any assessment in the case of Adam would be general principles. And the only ground you’ve given for saying Adam was not wise in disposition was that eventually he did one very unwise thing, so the only question is whether this principle is in fact true.

        Here’s another scenario. Solomon is generally thought to have been wise in disposition; in his old age he performs an action generally thought to be very unwise. By your principle this is impossible. Where is the impossibility?

      • May 12, 2014 at 2:48 pm

        In light of your exchange with Malcolm below, I should clarify that in the Solomon case I’m not asking whether you think the assessments are correct; rather, it’s that the Adam case requires that the assessments in the Solomon case cannot possibly be right — even if Solomon genuinely had decades and decades of nonstop wise actions, on the principle you are using in the Adam case, if he ever does even one single unwise thing he was never wise to begin with. So the question is: What is it about wisdom, specifically, that requires this?

      • Wade McKenzie said,

        May 12, 2014 at 2:58 pm

        Brandon, I just posted a comment at 2:56 pm that, at least partly, addresses the issue of common sense and where I think I make a sort of concession to your overall argument.

      • May 12, 2014 at 3:30 pm

        Thanks, Wade. That does at least make things more clear.

  6. May 12, 2014 at 1:07 am

    Of course wise men can do unwise things. Look at Soloman’s entire reign. The wisest man until Jesus did very, very unwise things, all the time, indeed.

    • Wade McKenzie said,

      May 12, 2014 at 10:09 am

      I think the “wisdom” of Solomon is a highly questionable thing.

      In spite of the common view that Solomon is the paradigmatic wise man of the Old Testament, it might rather be wiser (pardon the pun) to describe him as the paradigmatic fool.

      • May 12, 2014 at 10:15 am

        *Shrugs* If you believe it, God granted him great wisdom, and while he does many foolish things he is also recorded as doing many wise things as well – the famous “saw him in half” solution springing to mind quickly.

  7. CCK said,

    May 12, 2014 at 10:24 am

    Wade, the Christian tradition doesn’t hold that Adam was created in a final state of perfection with regard to his supernatural end — Eden was not heaven. And this side of heaven dispositions remain dispositions, not determinations, even in the most virtuous men. I sense an equivocation happening with respect to “completion” or “perfection.” Adam was not created lacking with respect to his nature, even though he was not yet perfected fully in grace (i.e., in possession of the Beatific Vision) — there was room for genuine growth in love and fellowship with God, which he was free to choose, just as he was free to reject it.

    To will the good irresistibly (as you seem to require of your wise man) is not a perfection of man per se, but of man raised to supernatural glory.

    P.S. James or Brandon is free to correct my understanding, as I am a mere an amateur here.

    • Wade McKenzie said,

      May 12, 2014 at 11:27 am

      Thanks for your response.

      I’m using perfection in the sense of “mature, complete.” I realize that can be misleading, given that the word more usually connotes something utopian or heavenly–which is why in my later comments I began to speak of “completeness” instead.

      I do think I understand what you and Brandon are saying–though I am an even more “perfect” amateur here than you–that the virtue of wisdom is a general disposition of a man that conduces to wise deeds, though not inevitably so. I would characterize this as a more “realistic” view of wisdom, a more sensible or mundane view, so to speak.

      One problem with this view is that it hinders our ability to recognize the wise man. I would submit that we primarily (though not exclusively) recognize the wise man in our midst by his abstinence from wrong, evil, sinful or foolish conduct. On your view, for instance, a man could commit adultery and we would have to say that he nevertheless may be a wise man. I would say, instead, that by that very action we understand him to be an unwise man.

      I would characterize your view of the virtue of wisdom as a disposition to the love or pursuit of wisdom and not a disposition to wisdom simpliciter.

      My view of the virtue of wisdom–that it is a disposition to wise action that never falters is undoubtedly a more “idealistic” or exalted view of the virtue of wisdom, and thus a more idealistic or exalted view of the wise man himself. It may be that it is an impossible ideal–in which case it serves as a standard by which to judge pretenders to wisdom and promotes instead a humble quest for wisdom. Alternatively, it is not impossible, but men who fulfill this conception are exceeding rare.

      May I be permitted recourse to two biblical examples of wise men?

      Jesus is obviously the wise man par excellence, who from beginning to end never failed to perform wise and virtuous acts. Why did he never fail to act wisely and virtuously? The answer is no doubt complex, but I would maintain that the most direct reason was that he was wise, that he possessed the virtue of wisdom. As to why or how he possessed this virtue of wisdom, well, that may be a long story but I would argue that the most important reason that he behaved virtuously–always–was that he was wise. No further explanation need be given.

      The apostle Paul is another biblical wise man, in my view. Obviously, unlike Jesus, he wasn’t always wise; but, by God’s grace, he became wise. Now, after Paul became wise did he ever falter from the path of virtuous conduct? Well, I suppose we can’t say for sure, but what we know of the redeemed apostle Paul from the NT gives no indication that he ever failed to act wisely or virtuously.

      But I would still like you–or anyone else–to just answer my question about Adam. Before the fall, was he or was he not a wise man? Yes or no?

    • CCK said,

      May 12, 2014 at 12:53 pm

      Wade,

      We may not be too far apart on this. The “realistic” and “idealistic” senses of wisdom, goodness, etc., are just ways of analogous predication whereby we distinguish that which belongs properly to man and that which belongs properly to God. Hence Christ: “No one is good but God alone.” Are wise men wise in the way that God is wise — i.e., essentially? No, but they can be wise in the way that men are wise — i.e., dispositionally.

      To be wise without possibility of failure — to be the ideal “wise man” — is to be incapable of sin, a condition which far exceeds human nature as such. You refer to Christ’s perfect wisdom; why was he impeccable? Because, being God, he possessed the perfect vision of God — which draws one irresistibly to the true Good — from the moment of his conception. It is pious to hold in view the divine sense of wisdom and goodness, and thus hold man to a high standard — but the fact that man qua man can only rise to them by the gift of grace, and can fall away from them at will, does not entail a defect in his creation. Hence when speaking of the virtues we can attribute wisdom to men even if it does not the same as God’s wisdom.

      Was Adam wise? I would say yes. He walked with God in holiness and justice, blessed with sanctifying grace and a certain amount of infused knowledge. Prior to the temptation, was he the wisest he could ever possibly become in his earthly life? No — he could have obeyed God and grown wiser, by cooperation with grace.

      To answer the question whether a wise man remains wise after he sins, one simply asks: Does he still possess that disposition? Sin necessarily weakens that disposition but whether it destroys it depends on the particular sin.

      • Wade McKenzie said,

        May 12, 2014 at 2:11 pm

        I thank you for the congenial nature of your remarks and I thank you too for directly answering the question I posed concerning Adam. Please know that I intend to continue to reflect on what you and others are arguing in this regard.

        Now, in keeping with all you are saying–concerning the virtue of wisdom generally, as well as prelapsarian Adam’s status as a wise man–you’re really obliged to say, are you not, that Adam *after* the fall is still a wise man? He made a mistake, but that doesn’t disqualify him from being wise, right?

        On your view, Adam may have been a wise man his whole life long, albeit not infallible. Thus he might possibly be one of the Bible’s great, though oft overlooked, wise men. Do you agree?

  8. Wade McKenzie said,

    May 12, 2014 at 2:56 pm

    In hindsight, I’d like to retract the last paragraph of my comment at 2:11 pm–it’s obviously rhetorical and too clever by half.

    After all, I don’t deny that an unwise man can become a wise man. It is indeed possible that Adam ended his days in full possession of the virtue of wisdom.

    The legitimate part of that comment is the query whether Adam in the immediate aftermath of the fall could still be considered a wise man. It seems to me that by Brandon’s and CCK’s lights, indeed he could be.

    That is a point of view which, at the level of common sense, tends to engender a certain unease. I said in a previous comment that my viewpoint on this matter of the Genesis story was more commonsensical than philosophic, so my own comments have largely been animated by the aforementioned unease.

    Perhaps it would be fair to characterize Brandon’s and CCK’s views as philosophic, in contradistinction to commonsensical. In other words, I feel that I’m now seeing two views of the Genesis story–one at the level of common sense, and the other ascending from the level of common sense to a higher perspective.

    And I would characterize that higher, more philosophic perspective as yielding a more liberal or humane conception of wisdom, one in which it is possible to see even Adam, the original sinner, as potentially a wise man both before and after he sinned.

  9. Wade McKenzie said,

    May 12, 2014 at 3:13 pm

    @ Brandon 2:48 pm

    What has led me to have an inexorable view of wisdom, whereby the wise man never fails to be wise, is that it seems to me that an important part of wisdom or being wise is to understand that the life of wisdom and wise action is to be cherished–not unlike the way in which a man who possesses the virtue of fidelity to his wife understands that his wife is to be cherished.

    Thus to depart from the life of wisdom and wise action seemed to me to reveal that a man is not in full possession of the virtue of wisdom, but rather a virtue of the love or pursuit of wisdom (as distinct from its attainment).

    But, as I say above, I think I’m beginning to see the compelling quality of your own point of view.

  10. Wade McKenzie said,

    May 12, 2014 at 3:27 pm

    What has caused me to alter my point of view on this matter is the fact that CCK was actually willing to assert that Adam before the fall was wise–something I assumed he or anyone else (including, of course, myself) would be unwilling to do.

    When he did that, I reflected on the possibility that it might be so. Sometimes, as you know, the contemplation of a thing as a mere possibility weakens our former opinion, however firmly held.

  11. May 12, 2014 at 5:18 pm

    James, read Dembski more carefully, such as Chapter 20, “Nature’s Receptivity to Information” in his The Design Inference: Answering the Toughest Questions About Intelligent Design.

    Dembski considers an objection to ID that’s similar to yours:

    “Although an unembodied designer who moves particles is not logically incoherent, such a designer nonetheless remains problematic for science. The problem is that physical mechanisms are fully capable of moving particles. Thus for an unembodied designer also to move particles can only seem like an arbitrary intrusion. The designer is merely doing something that nature is already doing, and even if the designer is doing it better, why did the designer not make nature better in the first place so that is can move the particles better?”

    Read the book to find out his solution.

  12. Itinérante said,

    May 14, 2014 at 5:54 am

    Possibly the most un-wise comment here. Sorry in advance.
    If because of the choice of men we need God to intervene in Salvation, does it not mean that well because of that same choice we need Him to intervene is the natural history? I am wondering, if the Evil affected salvation, created sin, does it not imply that the damage is spread to all what Man was given control over? For example, a bad hygiene person, would he not as well affect a clean bed and so we need to clean the man and the bed?


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: