One consequence of the idea that act is logically prior to potency is a temporal account of modalities such that if something will never come to be, then it can never come to be. There can be no real possibility of X without an actual X, and if the X in question is something temporal, then there must at some point be such a thing some such actual X in time. If, by hypothesis, we deny any real X occurring in time, we deny the very logical possibility of its real possibility.
Objection: the act that is logically prior is virtual act, and this can exist in an omnipotent creator.
Response: while we account for omnipotence by a relation to logical possibility, real possibility has to be said in relation to its proper actuality, not a remote or virtual one. Also, there is no contradiction in God making some temporal thing impossible by choosing never to create it in time, even if he could do so.
Objection: This makes contingency and free will impossible. If I will not choose X, then I cannot do so.
Response: The “will never” assumes a view of time sub specie aeternitatis, and will does not choose under such conditions.
Insisto: But either such a perspective is possible, or it is not: if it is, then our choices are rendered otiose by it; if not, then there is no such perspective to account for the truth of the axiom.
Response. Then why not see our choices as the rendering impossible of certain things? In the view of the one looking on, are choices render even possibilities impossible.