Arguments that we are certain that we must be uncertain about uncertainty vs. determinism

Take probability or uncertainty. Is it an ontological or epistemic reality?  We have yet to reach any conclusion, and so we drop the problem. But the only reason we are dropping the problem is that the goal is to be certain about one option or another, which opens the possibility of a third option: namely, that we are in principle and not just in fact unable to resolve the question by scientific means, and so can hold out no hope whether the sciences will be able to decide between ontological probabilism and determinism.  Here are a few arguments:

1.) Inductively, we have been arguing about probability since Pascal and the debate has only become more intense and intractable by QM.

2.) All measurements are imperfect. There is no way for it to distinguish non-mathematical rational and irrational magnitudes, and it is only precise within a finite accuracy. But certitude in the sciences is pegged to measurement.

2a.) A perfectly determined universe is logically possible, but it is, by definition, one whose motions are infinitely precise. But we are unable to verify the existence of an infinitely precise quantity, since all of our measurements have a definite, and therefore finite accuracy.

3.) For simplicity, we must treat some quantities as negligible but are not sure which ones are. Newtonian mechanics was verified to 10^-6, and if any quantity were basically negligible, it would be things on the Planck scale, though it made all the difference between classical and quantum physics. We have no idea how many scientific revolutions are right of the decimal point.


%d bloggers like this: