They’re not anti-materialist but anti-existence

Say that I’m right and arguments against materialism based on intention are not properly against what is material or physical but against what exists (or at least what exists of itself, which seems to be the same thing). After all, an immaterial entity, taken as simply an entity in itself, has no more “aboutness” than a physical one and so would bring us no closer to explaining thought as thought, or a concept as a concept. Anti-materialist arguments would thus amount to claims that there is some entity outside of entities. But if this is what it comes to, one might be in doubt over whether they  refute materialism or advance it. Can’t the materialist claim that the supposed refutations of his doctrine prove too much? It’s one thing to argue that there is some entity outside of material or physical things; it’s quite another to argue that there is something outside of entities.

I’m comfortable with the idea of reality outside of the real since this seems to be my experience – there does not seem to be anything in experience or sensation like the experience itself. What would it even mean for an entity to be “experience like” or even “like my experience”? Still, this does not mean that the abstract articulation or argument for such a thing is more compelling than it is confusing. It’s not clear if one gets a single view of existence when speaking about something beyond what is real or existent.

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