The longest book of Aristotle’s logic was his Topics, which perfected the logic of the first act of the mind through dialectics. One of the central goals of the book is the formation of definitions, which are best understood as the ideal names of things: i.e. what we would call something if we understood what it was as completely as we could when we first saw it. As it stands, this first glance only gives rise to a name, which is an imperfect grasp that stands in need of various degrees of refinement. We always grasp something in naming, but it is not always clear what we grasp, or if the thing we intended to name actually exists; or if it exists, if it is one thing, or many.
Logic has completely forgotten this motion from the name to the definition or definitions of something (I say “or definitions” because most names give rise to more than one definition). Because of this, our contemporary logic is- by its own admission- prone to being a game of “garbage in, garbage out” since the concepts that form propositions and syllogisms cannot be moved from name to definition or definitions by any accepted logical method. Logic is seen to be indifferent to this kind of argument. This motion from name to definition(s) is at the heart of the Socratic method, and it was the practice of philosophy in the philosophia perennis.
Definitions are not all of the same kind, nor is a definition of any kind always necessary for every kind of reasoning. But this makes the study of the logic of name to definition(s) all the more necessary, since we need to know when how, and in what way definitions are necessary or not.