In responding to an objection about whether truth is more in thing or in the mind, St. Thomas argues:
The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. >From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.
The argument has three elements:
1.) Truth involves some relation to intellect.
2.) Things proceed from the divine mind.
3.) Truth is caused by the human intellect.
Given (1), then (2) or (3) are as contradictories. But one is true, and the third is false.
A similar argument is possible with goodness, but it is trickier to make.