-All of Aristotle and St. Thomas’s arguments for nature acting for an end arise from a consideration of what is necessary for nature as mobile or changeable. The theory of evolution takes the mobility or changeability for granted, and so does not consider nature on the field in which Aristotle and St. Thomas’s arguments occur. How can one affirm or deny what they don’t consider? Isn’t the compatibility of teleology (in the consideration of nature as changeable) obviously compatible with evolution? Neither one considers nature on the precise field that the other considers it on.
-Say that evolution allows you a way to explain that the goods or goals in nature are only apparent. Great. But once you decide that the goods or goals of nature are real and not apparent, then you simply have no interest in one part of the theory of evolution. Just because some theory allows you to explain something as apparent doesn’t require that you see it as such.
-Imagine natural selection as a raffle. A bunch of moths show up to a raffle game, and someone pulls out “coal plant”. Black moths luck out, white moths diminish. Someone pulls out “coal burning plant burned down”. White moths luck out, black moths diminish.
It seems clear that there is no intention for black or white to be camouflage. The moth simply lucked out. But it’s hardly obvious that every feature and function can be explained like “black spots” and “camouflage”. That there should be one accidental relation does not require that all relations be accidental. Is there no difference between black/ camouflage and wing/ flight? What counts as a wing might not be easy to determine in every case, and the wings in natural things are not so determined to one thing that the things which are wings can’t come to serve new functions, but none of this merits simply saying that there is no relevant difference between “moth wing/ camouflage” and “moth wing/ flying tool”.