Thomists have been debating for years whether analogy is a metaphysical problem of a logical one. The debate usually seems to operate under a vague and unspoken assumption that if it were logical it would be somehow less dignified or less sublime. The sense is that it would be “merely” logical if it were logical at all. Not so. In saying that analogy is a logical problem (and I say it is at least this), we are saying that every branch of learning there is a need to understand the analogy of names, and a failure to grasp the analogy of names will inevitably cause a failure to understand the science. Failure to grasp when we are speaking analogously, metaphorically, or univocally will be just as much of a problem as confusing correlation with causality, arguing from the denial of the antecedent, or arguing from a syllogism with four terms.
Analogy as a logical problem
June 29, 2008 at 3:32 pm (Uncategorized)